Capitulos Special Edition 1996 SELA 6

Capítulos

Special Edition 1996

Change and Continuity in International Relations

Roberto Russell
Researcher of FLACSO/Argentina and the National Council for Scientific Research and Techniques of Argentina (CONICET)

I. The question of change versus continuity

The problems that arise from changes in world order are in fact the most interesting and controversial in the area of international relations. The end of the Ťcold warť has stirred up new debates on this issue focusing on the following: a) nature of the change (quantitative or qualitative); b) alternative scenarios of world order; and c) main issues of the new World Agenda.¹
This debate, which merits close attention, frequently develops in an all too reduced setting. It limits itself to speculating on the characteristics that the emerging order will have when the previous order (cold war) is replaced with the new one (currently unnamed). However, the progress of deep chnges in the world order greatly exceeds and precedes the end of the East/West rivalry. More so, to a great extent, it explains it.
It is, hence, my belief that any reflection process vis-à-vis transformations in international relations requires an analytical differentiation between three types of changes: end of the cold war, extension and deepening of the globalization phenomenon, and the crisis of the Westphalian order.
By distinguishing the changes in this manner, it becomes easier to both arrange and render a large number of data understandable. This provides enormous assistance in answering queries relating to new elements in world politics and economics, and to better grasp the impact of innovations in Latin America and the Caribbean.
On the other hand, any thought regarding global tendencies must include, besides aspects linked to the changes, an analysis of the elements of continuity. These elements tend to be ignored, particularly in the work of so-called Ťgurusť or theorists who assume an extremist vision of globalization.
In the following sections, an attempt will be made to identify innovative elements generated by the changes mentioned as well as elements of continuity. Lastly, several considerations will be set forth on the impact that change and continuity have on the region, placing special emphasis on opportunities and challenges that may arise.

II. The Cold War comes to a close

The first change -also the most fundamental and widely recognized- is commonly referred to as the end of the Cold War. The closing of that era is seen as the halt to ideological confrontations or of the struggle between two great powers, or as both simultaneously.
Since 1989, this process has gone through two phases, at least on the predominant perceptions level. The first phase goes from the beginnings of the Soviet Empire and the successive disappearance of real socialism in Eastern Europe until the end of the Gulf War. In this phase (that some call Ťliberal voluntarismť, and which had its best known and perhaps most extreme example in the thesis of Francis Fukuyama regarding the Ťend of historyť), a normative vision of world order based on the supposed basics of liberal internationalism prevails. In this same style, three basic conditions should be met to achieve world order: implementation of democratic regimes at a planetary level; the establishment of agreements between countries with the purpose of maintaining collective and cooperative security; and, finally, the functioning of a liberal economy. This means conditions that make commerce between nations possible, and as a result, global specialization.
The second stage starts at the end of the Gulf War until the present and is marked, not by the idea of the end, but instead by Ťthe return of historyť or, as one author put it, by Ťthe return to the futureť, where Ťfutureť should be read as Ťpastť.² Facts such as the disintegration of Yugoslavia; the war in Rwanda,; the Somalian tragedy; the conflicts between the States that formerly made up the Soviet empire; the peak of fundamentalism; put an end to the optimism typical of the first phase and encouraged the increase in speculation regarding Ťthe new international disorderť. The clearest example of the prevailing perceptions in this second phase can be found in the explanation expounded by Samuel Huntington regarding the Ťclash of the civilizationsť³ and in the work, in neo-realist code, of Waltz⁴, Mearsheimer⁵ and Layne⁶ on changes in power relationships among States.
Huntington's work, as is well-known, is based on a number of descriptive hypotheses regarding the future of international relations. For this author, the conflict between civilizations will replace ideological confrontations and others, as the prevailing (though not exclusive) form of worl conflict. Hence, the principal axis of world politics would be the relations between civilizations, especially between West and what Huntington simply refers to as the Ťrestť.⁷
Neo-realists, for their part, deem that the prevailing conflict will be between States and, security will be a matter of balance of power and alliances established on the basis of said balance and not on the basis of ideological affinities or relations founded on Ťcivilizedť ties. Their view is that the notion of order is merely empirical and not normative. It also calls for a specific distribution of global power among the main political units of a given era. The only path that will lead to a change in the Ťorderť is by way of a substantial modification made in the distribution of power characteristics between the Ťgreatť powers, or extremely important events within one of the main political units. Definitely, the change is essentially limited to quantitative aspects. Some States win while others lose the game spurred, above all, by inter-State rivalries, mistrust, and conflict. Apart from that which gives rise to this typical conduct (human nature or the anarchical condition of the international system), only one outcome is possible, i.e., that the future will be, essentially, like the past. As a result, the new scenario of world order will be characterized by the classic-style rivalry between great powers (probably United States of America, Europe, Japan, China, and Russia) competing, just as others States have done in the past, for power and prestige. This neo-realist view is equivalent to the Ťfragmentationť scenario of the international economy, applied by some political economists. In this scenario, opportunities to exploit potential advantages of globalization, manifested in the form of markets that are more open and increasingly integrated, would disappear at the mercy of closed regionalism (fragmentation). What is more, political conflict between the great powers would increase both directly between them and in order to keep areas of influence.
Many other diverse positions also exist between the liberal position and the realist position. However, most authors that adopted these positions tend to coincide on one central point: that in one part of the world international relations will be going through qualitative changes (clearly in the world made up of the developed countries), while the rest of the planet will do no more than repeat itself. To put this differently, in one place time would be an arrow and in the rest a circle, the one of the eternal return.⁸
These different interpretations of the future of international relations that bring together opposing elements have caused great confusion. The liberal perspective (as always) is essentially normative, seeing that it links the idea of order with the fulfillment of certain values, for example, the extension of democracy and human rights. The neo-realistic viewpoint is (also, as always) too static, incredibly pessimistic and, to a certain degree, reductionist. Huntington's thesis is simplistic and partial. The idea of pure Ťdisorderť is trivial, and also, incorrect.
The easiest way to sort out the problem is to ask ourselves, what kind of international order will we have throughout a continuum, that starts with fragmentation and conflict moving on to cohesion and cooperation.⁹ Or, in the words of Bull, how much society will there be in the international order being shaped.¹⁰
For our purposes, it is important to point out that since the establishment of the modern international system, societal elements have been a part of international relations, albeit with different intensity. In simpler terms, there has always been some type of order in international relations. It is worthwhile remembering that the Cold War years had a lot of international society (or order) in it, characterized by an apparently unresolvable bipolar confrontation: the United States of America and the former Soviet Union did not sever their diplomatic relations nor did they repudiate the idea of common international law, going as far as settng up rules to govern their reciprocal relations. From this viewpoint, the term international order is not to be associated with a universal triumph of any particular political philosophy (as is done by liberal internationalism or in line with the official Marxism of true socialists), but rather with the possibility of making coexistence and cooperation possible among actors with different values and convictions.
Having said this, a closer look can now be made of the new elements generated with the end of the Cold War:
1. A significant drop in antagonistic ideas, due not only to the Ťfallť of the former Soviet Union and the collapse of concepts that sustained real socialism, but also to the relative weakening of the assumptions used by the South in presenting its claims to the North. The importance of other ideas is undeniable in terms of the potential they have to stir up conflict (e.g., nationalism or various forms of fundamentalism); nevertheless, they have not had sufficient force to block the international order from becoming more homogeneous now than ever before, as defined by Aron.
2. The change in the nature of basic competition. During the Cold War, rivalry was based on the sense of mission of each one of the parties. This dispute revolved essentially around political, military and ideological issues. Now competition is founded on other characteristics. According to Pfaff, competition Ťis still of importance to national influence, but an influence that is achieved through commercial success and industrial and scientific leadership.ť¹¹.
3. The rise of previously subordinate issues on the agenda, known as the Ťnegative agendať, to the top of the global agenda: deterioration of the environment, poverty, population, proliferation, migrations, drug-trafficking, terrorism, nationalism.
4. The possibility of broadening the field of action for international agencies and for the strengthening and/or development of international regimes in numerous topic areas, particularly in traditional areas of inter-State security (disarmament, weapons control, nuclear and missile proliferation, etc.) and in the Ťnegative agendať topics (e.g., drug-trafficking and terrorism)¹².
5. At a more specific level, the end of the Cold War appears to have provided greater space for action and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean for State Actor and extra-hemispheric state and private actor. However, the United States will remain, for a long time yet, the key State Actor for the region, since it has the greatest relationship and structural power of the States. In other words, it has greater power than any other State to make others do what they would not do if they could avoid it. The U.S. is similarly the main actor in the primary structures of the world system ( i.e. security, production and knowledge structures)¹³. As pointed out by Yulchin: ŤEven in cases where Europe or Japan have greater participation in the trade of a Latin American country, neither Japan nor any other of European country would have any interest or be capable of exerting hemispheric influence remotely similar to a hegemony.¹⁴ Moreover, the ideological changes spurred in the region in favour of democracy and the free market, without prejudice to the questioning made in respect of the type of capitalism that exists in the United States, have incremented U.S. hegemonic power in Latin America and the Caribbean as regards consensus.
6. In reference to the impact that U.S. policy (or attitude) has on Latin America and the Caribbean, the end of the Cold War seemingly entails:
6.1. An increase in the importance of economic issues on the agenda (here the region enters Washington more because there is a window of opportunity than because of problems)¹⁵ as well as greater weight given to the Ťnewť issues on the Ťnegative agendať (drug-trafficking, terrorism, the environment, corruption, judicial security).
6.2. A change in the objectives of hemispheric security policy, summarized as follows: institutionalization of civil-military relations, aimed at actions of Latin American military toward external security and multinational cooperation, and restraining the dissemination of conventional weapons and those of massive destruction. Putting this into practice, however, has shown that contradictions exist between theory and practice. First of all because the strategy to be followed is not based on consensus and is further flawed by the ambivalence between the Ťinstitutionalistť and multilateral argument and a realist policy with marked emphasis on unilateral elements. Secondly, because new approaches clash with the persistent presence of traditional perspectives in military command structures. Thirdly, because support to reorient military activity toward external security contrasts with the emphasis put on the need to turn to the armed forces for issues that fall in the boundaries of domestic security as in the case of terrorism and drug-trafficking.¹⁶
6.3. A new kind of interventionism directed essentially at protecting U.S. interests that are affected by the Ťnegative agendať and that motivate different versions of diplomatic coercion.
6.4. A more sincere promotion of democracy and human rights. The reason for including sincerity is that during the Cold War the promotion of democracy meant, in general, supporting basically any force that was not communist. As Jervis points out: ŤMore frequently, the pursuit of democracy was seen as too dangerous: the fear of communism led the United States to support right-wing dictatorships for fear that if these were toppled, the victors might not be democratic reformers but instead, hard line left-wingers.ť¹⁷
6.5. A growing influence of the non-state actors on the formulation of policies toward the region. In Lowenthal's opinion: ŤFarmers and manufacturers, commercial enterprises, workers, consumers, environmentally-concerned groups, human rights and civil liberties groups, U.S. Hispanics of diverse origins and viewpoints, experts, foundations and the media, among others, will compete to influence policies in an enormously fragmented and highly permeable environment. The alliances and coalitions formed vary depending on the issues touched upon and the countries involved; they also defy simple categoriesť¹⁸.

III. The Globalization phenomenon

The second type of change can be summed up with a Ťcatchť phrase/ expression like Ťglobalizationť, which for this same reason can be made to mean just about anything, as it can also be interpreted to mean absolutely nothing. To avoid complicating the matter, I am willing to accept that globalization (perceived as a dense and dynamic pattern of global interconnection) started to emerge with the initial expansion of the world economy and the rise of the modern State at the end of the XVI century, and that this process ramified further in the XIX century with the growth of both trade and imperialism.¹⁹
The phenomenon known today as Ťglobalizationť, however, can be regarded as the current stage of a long historical process. It presents (particularly from the seventies on) a set of elements cnsidered innovative.
1. It signals the undetermined extension (geographic reach of the phenomenon) and the deepening (intensity of the phenomenon) of links and interconnections among States and the societies that make up the world systemť.²⁰
2. It implies an impressive increase in the degree and a change in the type of interdependence, expressed through multiple communication networks and in the interaction among governments and national societies.²¹ Among others, interdependence leads most States to the emphasis of a collective viewpoint rather than a unilateral one when faced with the wide variety of issues and to consider war as an increasingly less tolerable alternative due to the sharp rise in costs and the drop in benefits.
3. The increasing internationalization of production, finance, and trade. This process, which is beyond the control of States, calls for the relinking of political spaces because the State no longer serves as an adequate Ťpolityť to face up to new political, social, and economic challenges and realities of an interdependent world. In this fashion we can see a definite break between the territorial authority of the State and the current reach of the production, distribution and exchange systems and the globalization of the financial transactions.²² The State tends to adapt to this type of situation by Ťinternationalizing itselfť (Cox)²³, becoming Ťmediatorť of domestic and international pressure (Rosecrance)²⁴.
4. In the framework of globalization a modification of the preceding scale of economic hierarchies has developed with the rise of different countries of the Third World (China, the Asian Tiger countries and some Latin American countries) as well as with the widening of the gap between the underdeveloped countries (of Africa, several of Asia and Latin America) and developed countries.²⁵
5. The exclusion of vast portions of the world's population from the production process. The most obvious consequence of this for many countries are rising unemployment, poverty, and migratory patterns that go beyond borders to areas of more abundant wealth. The reaction to this process has been the rise of new obstacles. It has also caused the resurfacing of tribal expressions.
6. The globalization of the economy is not accompanied by a corresponding institutional globalization. Based on its own interests and values, the United States exercises a certain amount of power as the unilateral policeman for the world. Nevertheless, new international governance schemes are being developed in a wide array of issues pertaining to international relations.

IV. The crisis of the Westphalian order

The third change to consider is the weakening of the long-standing ŤWestphalianť historical structure. The crisis of this order dates further back than the Cold War itself and to globalization in the sense just expounded herein. Its origins can be traced to the end of the First World War and can be explained by several factors that by no means are exclusively of an economic order. In order words, globalization has played an important role in eroding the Westphalian State. But, a crisis of this order extends even further than the economic realm. It has to do with, among other factors of great leverage, changes in political systems, marked cultual changes, and the revolution in terms of Ťthe people's abilitiesť to put it in the words of Rosenau.²⁶
Unlike the other two changes, the Westphalian crisis is still being debated in academic circles, and principally by international relations specialists.
Nevertheless, this change has important ramifications at the practical level. As a result, it is interesting to make references to this respect. Following is a somewhat schematic description of the most outstanding points concerning the Westphalian crisis:
1. The crisis of its principle of order: State sovereignty, understood as the supreme power over a population and a territory.
2. The crisis of its basic behavioral pattern: the search for autonomy in a world famous for rivalry among States.²⁷
3. As a consequence of 1 and 2, the crisis, or at least the profound questioning of the rules of coexistence and the institutions on which this order is based; particularly, the balance of power; the action of the great powers in their areas of influence and war.²⁸
From this point on, the basic premise of the Westphalian order is questioned, namely, that the interaction among the States (understood as entities that are relatively self-sufficient and with exclusive power over a territory and a population and that respond to no higher authority) is what dominates global politics.
It is also said, on the other hand, that the distinction made between inter-State/international and intra-State/intra-national at a time when many State entities become increasingly weaker and have to compete or share authority with other political forms. Further, it is pointed out that in spite of the change in the nature of the global policy, the greater part of the analysis is made on the basis of the intellectual baggage and language proper of the centralized State, in other words, the Westphalian State. This language would express a historical reality that no longer exists and consequently, is obsolete. What is more, it is not only obsolete but also inadequate to grasp the basis aspects of the current global situation.
To shed light on the above, another example should be cited in respect of the recent debate between Mandelbaum and Hoffmann regarding Clinton's foreign policy. Mandelbaum strongly questions the opinion expressed by Hoffmann of its strong dependence on Westphalian categories. He states that: ŤToday's world is post-Westphalian: a myriad of normative restrictions and an enormous loss of autonomy due to transnational forces is generally breaking down the State's sovereignty; and the State itself, the basis for the Westphalian construction is cracking in many parts of the worldť.²⁹
1. It is necessary to consider that: a) the global political structure is constantly undergoing changes as a result of the dynamics of three generic trends -status quo, expansion and contraction of political entities (polities);³⁰ b) that this phenomenon is universal; c) that it arises in all eras of history and hence is not a product of modern times; and d) that every era has had coexisting political entities with relations based on both cooperation and conflict.
2. The Westphalian order was affected from the beginning by a dynamic process of status quo, expansion and contraction of the political entites, and the Westphalian form itself has changed throughout the centuries (for example, its post- Napoleonic adaptation to democracy and popular sovereignty). In this way the Nation-State (the very political entity that characterizes Westphalian order) was challenged by subnational entities that appeal to different loyalties than the ones the Nation-State proposes and demands (for example, Scottish and Basque nationalism) and by potentially expansive entities based on economic, class-oriented, religious or ideological considerations.
3. Regardless of this, the dynamics of expansion and contraction never caused as many challenges to the Nation-State as now. To explain this process two other substantial changes must be considered: the end of the Cold War and globalization.
4. The nature of the East/West rivalry made the State necessary. The existence of a clear enemy reinforced the need to rely on resources of military power and control corresponding societies for fear of them falling into, or becoming associated with, the other side. That this rivalry was placed at the top of the agenda by the most powerful countries and the possibility, although suicidal, of a general war, kept the importance of the government at a national level and contributed towards the secrecy of many of its growing weaknesses. With the end of the Cold War, these weaknesses became more apparent. At the same time, the end of the Cold War facilitated the awakening of old identities and the reappearance of new loyalties that try to insure a political hold in different Ťpolities.ť³¹
5. Globalization, on the other hand, has dramatically affected both the importance and the role of the State. Arguments used to demonstrate the impact abound and are well-known. What is clearest is that the dynamics of the present economy and the technological revolution made frontiers obsolete, altering the nature of time and space in world politics. Within this framework, the State is less autonomous and has less control over the political, economic, and social processes that take shape within its territory. In the face of this situation, which no one denies, it has been widely pointed out that the reign of the Nation-State is coming to its end and that governance at the national level is far from being effective (if at all) when faced with economic globalization. Writers such as Reich and Ohame, for example, view States as Ťlocal authoritiesť of the global system, somewhat like the Ťmunicipalitiesť of the XXI century, responsible for providing global-wide services.³² In my judgment these views are extremist. It is nevertheless also true that under these new terms of reference, the role of the Nation-State needs to be redefined and, among others, new meaning, given to the concept of sovereignty in order to transcend the Westphalian perspective.
This is a task of great significance for Latin America and the Caribbean given that it is in essence a recipient region, and not one that spurs change. For this very same reason, it is also a region where the State is the most important political entity (and will continue to be so for a number of years) in dealing with the negative effects of globalization and treating those aspects concerning the new Ťnegative agendať. It should be noted that by stating this I set myself apart from extreme globalist views that consider that the global system will be governed by market competition and that public policies will in the best of cases hold second place in terms of importance. As may be gleaned, a new twist is given to an old concept whereby the market functions best when there is less intervention. It is, therefore, not by chance that the most arduous of globalization's advocates are in favor of passivity.

V. Final Considerations: Cange and Continuity

Taking the above-mentioned aspects into consideration, following are a number of reflections offered in conclusion.
First of all, concerning the debate on scenarios of world order, it would be convenient to vouch for the one that emphasizes the existence of qualitative changes in international relations, at least in the world made up by the Western countries forming a sort of Ťpacific union of nationsť in the Kantian sense. In effect, relations among these countries are characterized by the absence of war among them, a strong sense of interdependence, and ongoing enforcement of international regimes. Further, all these countries have democratic regimes, which is a sine qua non condition for peace.
In this framework, continuity prevails over change. To see this more clearly, one must understand how the Second World War gave rise to two types of fundamental agreements between Western countries, based on distinct intellectual thought and political needs. The first, which held a dominant role, arose from increasing rivalry between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in response to the so-called Ťcommunist threatť. The second, on the other hand, was a reaction to economic competition and the serious political problems in the 30s and the war that followed.³³ The first, referred to as the order of the cold war, led to containment, the arms race, and ideological competition. In short, what arose was a inter-imperial confrontation of global reach. And the second, referred to as the Ťdemocratic liberal orderť was founded on several agreements and institutions establishing ties between developed capitalist countries under the leadership (if you like Ťhegemonyť) of the United States of America.
The first order is the one that came to an abrupt and unforeseen end. Its previous centrality was based on the continuity of the second. The latter, of course, has undergone a wide array of problems and will have to face up to innumerable difficulties.
However, I do not share the position of the realist view that says that cooperation among developed Western democracies is a result of the cold war and that with its disappearance, intra-North relations will deteriorate giving rise to new situations in what concerns the balance of power and inter-State rivalries.
Let it also be known that I do agree that the rivalry between the West and the East had a great deal to do with the bonding between Western countries. It is not a minor aspect. Nevertheless, I consider that global trends do not move in the direction of intra-North confrontation but instead towards the continuation and extension of the liberal democratic order. Despite pessimistic forecasts made by neorealists, NATO is still alive and well, and the different regionalization processes currently in fashion everywhere are fundamentally different to the autarchical experiments of the 30s.
I bring this scenario into play for empirical reasons as well as for normative ones. To begin, it is the first time the region counts on the necessary conditions to form part of this Ťpacific unionť (put into other words, to stay clear of the idea of History as an eternal circle) and, because it is simply most convenient for us. A neorealist scenario, marked by conflict, the balance of power, and the unavoidable rise in economic protectionism would place heavy restrictions on our margin for international action.
Let it be clear, however, (and I do stress this point so that my argument is not misinterpreted) that I am marking a global trend. This does not mean that the order referred to is being threatened (this can happen to any order at any given point in time) or that we are going moving to a higher level of peace and justice. Precisely one of the key aspects of this order -and perhaps its main threat- is the rising inequality and growing margination of large sectors of the world population. Latin America and the Caribbean are not exceptions to this situation which negatively affects the democratiztion process and consequently weakens its potential to join this Ťpacific unionť.
Secondly, the end of the cold war has had a fundamental impact on the political and security agendas at both global and regional levels. Here we see more changes than we see opportunities. And in some cases, more than continuities we have a return to patterns that existed prior the cold war. Allow me to present but a few examples to further clarify the point being made.
Changes: a) redefining U.S. security interests in Latin America and the Caribbean ; and b) the increasing importance that new issues on the global agenda have for the region (and particularly those of the negative agenda) which need to be treated multilaterally. Many of these issues make up a real threat to the national security of the countries of the region and will give rise to tension not only with the United States but also with other extra-hemispheric countries. As may be gleaned from the case of Colombia, these tensions can lead up to the re-emergence of nationalist movements.
Continuity: Just as during the cold war, the region continues to show concern over economic issues, which still rank first.
Return to traditional patterns: Resurgence in the United States of traditional approaches in treating the region. ŤThese attitudes -that cannot be coined as being either a coherent or conscious policy, but rather as encompassing number of concurrent attitudes- include an aversion to interference by strangers, a compulsion to avoid instabilities should this have an impact on the U.S. and a desire to preserve the U.S. freedom of action in such a way that global interests are not compromised.ť³⁴
Thirdly, the globalization change, as it is considered here, has had a phenomenal impact on the forms of State, national cultures, integration processes, and development strategies Ťaimed inwardsť in Latin America and the Caribbean. This made it necessary to adapt them, and somewhat like flipping the coin, to increasingly define external policies in economic terms. It is interesting to note that the changes made in the external policies of the countries of the region (of course, with the specificities of each national case) began to take on an increasingly Ťpragmaticť note prior the end of the cold war. This last point would have done no more than speed up and strengthen the change that had already started to take shape earlier on.
And fourth, the Westphalian-type crisis is accelerating and intensifying with the end of the Cold War and globalization. An enormous field is opening up to discuss the concept of sovereignty, the rules for coexistence and the institutions (or, what is almost the same, the governance of the international order) and on the relation that exists between the rights of the State and individual and human rights (this complex and conflictive relationship is manifested, for example, in the current discussion on intervention or, as put by others, on the right and responsibility to interfere).
The role of the State and of politics needs to be rescued in the face of arguments being leveled by extreme globalists. The world is just a little too complex and dynamic for interdependence or the market alone to satisfy its needs and desires. It is true that the State today is a political entity in a complex power system which includes supra-national and local levels. Nonetheless, it continues to be the principal political actor. It is the place (especially when the State is democratic) from which the spaces of international, regional, national and local governance can best be determined, legitimized and monitored. In the words of Hirst and Thomson: ŤNation-States can do this in a way in which other agencies cannot. They are pivots between the international agencies and subnational activities, because they provide legitimacy as the exclusive voice of a territorially limited people.ť³⁵
As a result, our States have new roles to play at a time when conditions are better than in the recent past (maybe better than ever) to play a role with some substance in international affairs and to assume greatr responsibilities. Nothing much needs to be invented to do this. All that is required is cooperation and the willingness to revise certain of our old traditions for the benefit of a new and imperative governance that will include and accommodate, within a framework of growing interdependence, the impact of the three changes mentioned as well as the broad space of continuity.

NOTES

This debate also has an academic side which refers to the discipline's categories and nucleus itself.
John Mearsheimer, ŤBack to the Futureť in International Security, Summer 1990, Vol. 13, No. 1.
Huntington, Samuel, ŤEl Enfrentamiento de las Civilizaciones?ť in Agora, November 1993.
Waltz, Kenneth, ŤThe Emerging Structure of International Politicsť in International Security, Fall 1993, Vol. 18, No. 2.
Mearsheimer, John, op. cit.
Layne, Christopher, ŤThe Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Riseť in International Security, Spring 1993, Vol. 17, No. 4.
It is convenient to point out that after identifying the conflict between civilizations as a dominating form of world conflict, Huntington also indicates what he does not uphold: that is, that the identity as regards civilization will replace all other identities, that Nation-States will disappear, that each civilization will become a single and coherent political entity, that the groups within a civilization will not have conflicts nor war among themselves.
See Jervis, R. ŤThe Future of World Politics. Will It Resemble The Pastť in International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1991.
See Roseneau James N., ŤGovernance; order, and change in world politicsť, in Roseneau James N. and Czempiel Ernst-Otto, Governance without government: order and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
See the author's definition of Ťinternational societyť in Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, p. 13.
William Pfaff, ŤRedefining World Powerť in Foreign Affairs, America, and the World 1990/1, p. 37.
It merits citing as reference the example of the Struggle Against Terrorism Plan of 25 points signed by the G7 countries and Russia on July 30, 1996 in Paris. The document impulses the rapid and secret exchange of information, the reinforcement of sanctions and dissuasion, restriction of the movement of terrorists (to keep them from receiving the possible benefits of asylum), the destruction of financial sources and the restriction of the use of international information networks to their gain.
Strange, Susan. ŤLa economía política en Europať in América Latina/International, Spring 1993, vol. 1, No. 1.
Tulchin, Joseph S., ŤLos Estados Unidos y América Latina en el mundoť, in the magazine published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cults of Argentina, Foreign Service Institution of Argentina, Year 2, No. 3, 1993, p. 62.
This step from a negative agenda to a positive agenda has been emphasized in the United States and Latin America by many analysts and politicians, beginning with Bush. See, for example, Insulza, J.M. ŤEstados Unidos y América Latina en los noventať in Pensamiento Iberoamericano, No. 19, Madrid, January-June 1991, p. 220.
See Buchanan, Paul and Sutliff, Brian, ŤLa política de seguridad hemisférica de Estados Unidos en el contexto internacionalť in Russell, Roberto and Bouzas, Roberto (orgs.) Globalización y regionalismo en las relaciones.
Jervis, R., op. cit., 66.
Lowenthal, A. F., ŤEstados Unidos y América Latina en la década de los noventa: los cambios en los intereses y políticas estadounidenses ante un mundo nuevoť en Estados Unidos, Informe Semestral Vol. III, No. 1, Spring, 1993, p. 82-83.
There are roughly three stages can that can be distinguihed in the globalization process. The first process begins with discoveries made by sea and which consolidated mercantilism at the end of the XVII century and during the early XVIII century. The second stage is said to cover from the end of the XVIII century with the early beginnings of industrialization, growing stronger during the second half of the XIX century as a direct result of the colonial empires and the entry of the United States of America into the big industrial era. And finally, the third stage begins with the end of WWI when an international trade system and regulations were set up and becomes more solid following WWII with the creation of the United Nations and the technological revolution of the second half of the century. For a more detailed discussion, see Robert Lawrence, Albert Bressand, and Takatoshi Ito, A Vision for the World Economy, Openness, Diversity, and Cohesion (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996) and Charles Oma, Globalisation and Regionalisation: The Challenges for Developing Countries (Paris, OECD Development Centre, 1994). Also see the recent book by Aldo Ferrer, Historia de la globalización. Orígenes del orden económico mundial. Fondo de Cultura Económica, Buenos Aires, 1996.
See David Held and Anthony McGrew, ŤGlobalization and the Liberal Stateť in Government and Opposition, Spring. 1993.
This phenomenon is clearly not linear and does not affect all the States and national societies in the same manner.
In respect of this point, see the interesting and highly polemic article by Rosecrance, Richard ŤThe Rise of the Virtual State: Territory Becomes Passeť in Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996.
See Cox, Robert, ŤSocial Forces, States, and World Orders. Beyond International Relations Theoryť in Keohane, Robert O. Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia, New York, 1986.
See Rosecrance, Richard, The Rise of the Trading State, Basic Books, New York, 1986.
A recent article published in the Foreign Policy magazine provided an extremely interesting table on the economic changes with forecasts for the next twenty-five years. See Richard Halloran, ŤThe Rising Eastť in Foreign Policy No. 102, Spring 1996, p. 11. The only Latin American country included in the table is Brazil; according to the table Brazil will go from holding a rank of No. 7 to that of No. 10.
Rosenau, James N., ŤThe New Global Order. Underpinnings and Outcomesť, paper presented at the XV International Congress of the International Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, July 24, 1991.
Zacher Mark, ŤThe decaying pillars of the Westphalian temple: implications for international order and governanceť in Rosenau, James N. and Czempiel Ernst-Otto, Governance without government: order and change in world politics. Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 20, Cambridge, 1992.
Bull, Hedly, op. cit.
Hoffman, Stanley, ŤIn Defense of Mother Teresa. Morality in Foreign Policyť in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2, March/April 1996, p. 174.
See Ferguson Yale, & Mansbach, Richard, ŤPolitical Space and Westphalian States in a World of _Polities' Beyond Inside/Outsideť in Global Governance 2, 1996, p. 272.
Ibid., p. 271.
See Hirst, Paul and Thompson, Grahame, Globalization in Question, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 176.
The author took this argument from Ikenberry, John G., ŤThe Myth of Post-Cold War Chaosť, in Foreign Affairs, May/June 1996, p. 81.
Tulchin, Joseph, op. cit., p. 57.
See Ferguson Yale & Mansbach, Richard, op. cit. p. 190.

CONTENT

http://www.sela.org
sela@sela.org
SELA, Secretaría Permanente
Av Francisco de Miranda, Torre Europa, Piso 4, Urb. Campo Alegre,
Caracas 1060- Venezuela
Tlf: (58) (212) 955.71.11 Fax: (58) (212) 951.52.92