THE CUBAN CASE: AN AGE OLD PHENOMENON

Rolando García Quiñones
Centro de Estudios Demográficos. Universidad de La Habana.

I. An Old Phenomenon

In Cuba international migration is not a recent phenomenon. Before the discovery indigenous populations from other territories in the Antilles arrived in Cuba and subdued our native people who were among the most backward and peaceable in the region. The colonization and conquest that began in the 16th century brought to Cuba, as to other parts of America, a growing number of Spanish migrants, resulting after only four decades in the elimination of the native population. The disappearance of this labour force led to the introduction of African slaves. Even though the presence of four African slaves was first recorded in 1513, the forced migration of African slaves reached a zenith during the 19th century. For example, in 1841, 436,495 slaves were registered in Cuba. They represented 43% of the country's 1,007,624 inhabitants. It is estimated that 816,000 slaves were brought to Cuba between 1521 and 1873.

Moreover, large numbers of Chinese migrants entered the country during the second half of the 19th century. It is estimated that between 1848 and 1874 approximately 124,000 Chinese arrived in Cuba, under very similar conditions to those of the African slaves^.1

Between 1849 and 1861 Indians from the Yucatán also entered Cuba under conditions similar to those of the Chinese immigrants. Some authors estimate that a total of 2,000 people from the Yucatán settled in the island.

Data from population censuses provide an approximate estimate of immigration flows during the 19th century.

In reality, since Cuba was a Spanish "province" there was not much interest in recording migration movements, hence it is not an easy task to calculate the total number of Spanish people who entered the island. Also, since it was one of the last colonies to achieve independence, Cuba received many soldiers and officials who abandoned the other colonies as they gained independence or came under the control of other European nations.²

During the second half of the 19th century the precarious economic and social situation fuelled the contradictions between opposing political forces in Cuba, accelerating the demise of the colonial model. The Demajagua cry launched Cuba's independence wars: the Ten Years War (1868-1878), the War for Independence (1895-1898) and the Hispanic-Cuban War (1898). The latter included such peculiar developments as the intervention of the United States of America, the defeat of Spain, the appointment of a U.S. governor and the establishment of the so-called "República Mediatizada" (1898-1902).

In reality, U.S. interventions in Cuba began much earlier than its military participation in the conflict. Already during the seventies decade of the 19th century, the United States had began investing in railroads and sugar mills, transferring to the island U.S. personnel to oversee such investments.

The new government, in an effort to restore the island's economy, stimulated immigration through a number of measures and laws aimed at encouraging the importation of labour for agriculture. During the first three decades of the 19th century, during which Cuba enjoyed a period of economic bonanza, large numbers of immigrants entered the country, mostly in search of jobs. However, the authorities in charge at the times attempted to select migration flows by country of origin. On May 15, 1902, a military order closed Cuba's borders to migrants from Haiti, Jamaica and China, while on June 12, 1906, a law allocated funds to attract white families to stimulate agriculture.

A few years later the regulations restricting access to people from the Antilles were repealed and in 1913 a U.S. firm received permission to import day labourers from that region. Thus, new flows of migrants from Jamaica, Haiti and, to a lesser extent, Puerto Rico joined the growing number of Spanish immigrants. Migrants from the U.S. were mostly administrators, officials and experts assigned to that country's enterprises in the island.

The largest number of immigrants entered the country during the years of greater economic boom, such as the 1920s. This included a sizable number of immigrants from China who, to a large extent, were coming from the U.S.

The total number of immigrants reached over one million people (see Table 2).

Table Nº 2. Cuba: Immigrants according to period of entry (1902-1934) and distribution according to country of origin

As regards the social and demographic characteristics of the immigrants who entered Cuba during those three decades it should be noted that over 80% were men, over 90% between 15 and 45 years of age and more than 70% single.

Beginning in 1930 immigrations began to lose importance to the point that they were no longer registered in the bulletins on immigration and the movement of passengers published during the first years of the 20th century.

Many of the Spanish immigrants who arrived in Cuba during its economic boom returned to their homeland. The laws adopted in 1933 contributed to this emigration, as well as to the emigration of people from the Antilles. During the years between the 1931 and 1943 censuses the migration balance was, for the first time, negative due to the forced repatriation of immigrants from the Antilles began by the government of Gerardo Machado and the constant emigration of Cubans, among other factors.

To these migration movements we must add the sizable exodus of Cubans to other American countries, preferably the U.S. Most of the Cubans who migrated to the U.S. at the time were young black and mulatto workers and labourers who settled in New York and New Jersey in search of jobs and did not experience any upward mobility, as almost all immigrants from the Caribbean at the time.

Thus, the world crisis (1929-1933) and the consequent collapse of sugar production at the beginning of the 1930s marked the end of Cuba as a destination for immigrants.
The migration of Cubans to the U.S. really began at a significant scale over one and a half centuries ago. The first flows of Cuban migrants to the U.S. began during the second half of the 19th century. In 1870, 12,000 Cubans had settled in the U.S., compared to the total number of Cubans: 1,445,000³ (this represents a rate of 8 per thousand). In 1890, when Cuba's population was 1,600,000 million people, this number reached 20,000 (a rate of 12 per thousand) and in 1910 it doubled to 40,000. Given a total population of 2,236,000 people this latest figure represents a rate of 18 immigrants per each thousand inhabitant.

According to some sources, around 35,145 Cubans emigrated between 1930 and 1950, mostly to the U.S. Between 1950 and 1958 the number of Cubans living in the U.S. reached 50,950.

These data support the thesis put forth by some experts that even without the Cuban Revolution the migration of Cubans to the U.S and other parts of the world would have continued, very possibly with greater intensity.

II.    International Migrations from 1959

During the last four decades international migration in Cuba has been characterized by its singular social, economic and geopolitical causes, which continue to be latent. The beginning of the Revolution changed the reasons for migration, which began to reflect political factors related to the conflict with the U.S. and economic factors derived from such conflict (for example, the embargo) and from the evolution of the revolutionary process, within a context of social justice, which has confronted enormous financial difficulties, a frail productive support system and limited resources and consumer goods.
Ever since the triumph of the Revolution in 1959 the balance of outward migration has remained negative, registering some surges during times of greater conflict in political relations between Cuba and the U.S. and critical economic situations.

The flows of migrants can be divided into different stages or cycles according to volume and quality:

1) The flow of emigrants following the triumph of the Revolution (1959-1962). These emigrants define themselves as "exiles". The issue of migrations begins to acquire ideological and political connotations within the framework of the Cuba-U.S. conflict, a process that is complemented by the establishment of the embargo. At the beginning of the 1960s the U.S. establishes the Cuban Refugees Program and uses the problem of migration as a hostile tool against the Cuban Revolution.

From the perspective of Cuba, migration policies acquire a defensive, restrictive and excluding character and emigration is viewed as "the abandonment of the homeland", often labelled as "migration without return" or "definitive migration".

2) A wave of emigrants from 1965 to the first years of the 1970's. The 1966 "Cuban Adjustment Law" granted Cuban migrants to the USA the status of 'political refugees', and comparatively preferential treatment.⁴

Following the 1962 October Crisis (or "Missile Crisis") the possibility of leaving Cuba to enter the U.S. was suspended and the 'pressure cooker' theory, aimed at internally destabilizing the island, led to Cuba's decision to allow the emigration of large numbers of people through the Camarioca harbour (1966-1971).

3) Migration flows since 1980, from the harbour of Mariel ("Los Marielitos").

4) The so-called "Boat People Crisis" of 1994, which led to a revision of the migration problem by both countries and the beginning of conversations on this issue that culminated in the 1994 Migration Agreements and their 1995 complementary agreements. These agreements are aimed at eliminating, or at least reducing, illegal migration, even though they do not remove the preferences granted to Cuban migrants.

Thus, every migration wave has been conditioned by multiple factors, such as the "temperature" of the conflict between both countries, the preferential treatment granted by U.S. policies to Cuban immigrants, the political pressure exerted by Cuban exiles and, obviously, Cuba's internal economic and social situation.

According to some sources between 1959 and 1999, 1,079,000 Cubans migrated to different countries. Today, the total Cuban population residing abroad is estimated to be above 1,400,000 people. The U.S. 1990 census registered 1,043,932 people of Cuban origin, while in the 2000 census that number totalled 1,241,685, 48.4% men and 51.6% women. Cubans represent 0.4% of the U.S. population and 4.0% of the Hispanic population living in the U.S.

III.    Cuban Emigration: Ways and Means

• Legal emigration: During the last forty years close to 900,000 people migrated legally to different countries. It is estimated that around 130,000 Cubans live in Latin America (in Venezuela, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Argentina and Chile); approximately 37,000 reside in Europe (mostly Spain, Italy and Germany) and more than 1,000 in the rest of the world, for example, Canada and some of the former socialist Eastern European countries such as Russia.

• Illegal emigration: These flows target mainly the U.S., including the Guantanamo Naval Base, the Great Caiman Islands, the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic, among other countries. From 1985 up to the signing of the 1994 Migration Agreements, the number of illegal emigrants reached 82,500, including both successful and failed emigration attempts. From 1994 up to the mid-2000 a total of 7,500 Cubans arrived in the U.S., including those who were intercepted by the U.S. Coastguard and returned to Cuba under the Migration Agreements. Following 1994 legal Cuban migration flows tended to stabilize, as did restrictions to illegal entries through the coast. However, Cubans continued to enter the U.S. through other routes, including the smuggling of people.

• The 'Exodo' Programme: Another way to enter the U.S., besides appealing to family ties, is through "bridge" countries. In fact, "Exodo" is the name of a programme established by the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF) to bring Cubans to the U.S. from third countries. By 1992, more than 8,500 Cubans had entered the U.S. through this programme.

• Forced return: This policy is applied to some Cuban immigrants, for example the "Marielitos excludibles", those retained in 1994 at the Guantanamo Naval Base who were not accepted as immigrants by the U.S., as well as Cubans who attempt to enter the U.S. by sea and are captured by the U.S. Coastguard, as agreed in the Migration Agreements. This also includes Cubans who are returned by other countries that have signed agreements with the Cuban government. From the signing of the Agreements up to the year 2000, U.S. authorities returned to Cuba 2,800 people caught at sea, and 480 who entered through the Guantanamo Naval Base.

• No return (temporary visas): These are people who travel abroad as visitors or for personal or official reasons (work, study, etc.) and decide not to return to Cuba. An important number of such people entered the U.S. until the early 1990s, however this tendency has changed and the number of countries of destination has increased.

• Temporary emigration: This is a new aspect of Cuba's international migration. The number of people under this category has increased since the second half of the 1990s, covering different sectors of Cuban society. It reveals a flexibilization of Cuba's migration policy and the impact of the Special Period. The "Permit to Reside Abroad" (PRE, in Spanish) is a new aspect of Cuba's flexibilization of migration policies, it is granted to people who do not attempt nor wish to abandon forever their country of origin.

IV.     Agreements, Policies and Potential Migration

The signing of the 1994 Migration Agreements and their 1995 complementary agreement was aimed at stabilizing migration to the U.S., eliminating or at least reducing illegal migration. Even though they do not cancel preferences to Cuban immigrants the agreements have indeed established a control framework that has made it possible to regulate the process. However, the problem of illegal migration continues and will do so to the extent that conditions exist in the country of origin and the country of destination that stimulate it.

In keeping with U.S. policy the agreements themselves are preferential in that they establish a special immigration lottery for Cubans (Cubans may also participate in the regular international immigration lotteries). This preference is in addition to previous projects such as the Cuban Adjustment Law. It is important to stress this because the aspects that receive the most attention and are the object of propaganda, thanks to the absolute control of the media, refer to internal conditions and problems in the island, which are undoubtedly a factor for emigration.

One of the measures established in the agreements is the granting by the U.S. of a minimum of 20,000 visas per year, according to selection criteria that allow it to obtain a timely and systematic diagnosis of the island's migration potential. According to some studies, Cuba's migration potential varies between a minimum of 490,000 and a maximum of 800,000 people. The educational level of Cubans who intend to migrate tends to be relatively high, in fact, most are professionals and experts. This group includes mostly young men between 25 and 35 years of age, most of them white and a higher number of women than in the past. The majority of them reside in Havana (65%), Villa Clara, Camagüey and Pinar del Río.

Even though all countries have a right to grant or deny entry to specific people or visitors, political manipulations in the granting of visas have destabilized migration flows between the U.S. and Cuba and continue to stimulate illegal and definitive emigration.

Today's Cuban society comprises other groups of people who may or may not be included in the migration potential and who are not as interested in definitive migration.

During the last decades, emigration flows have included both temporary and permanent emigrants, as well as large numbers of people who have visited countries where other Cubans reside (160,000 between 1995 and 1997).

V.    Migration, Remittances and the Effects of Globalization

Compared with previous migration flows, today's Cubans emigrate for different reasons, mostly economic reasons, to join family members or, in their words, because they have lost faith in the Cuban project's capacity to overcome the current crisis (or Special Period).

There is no doubt that today the decision to emigrate is part of Cubans' survival strategies to solve daily problems and increase the income of other family members through cash remittances from abroad and other kinds of assistance.

In his article on migrations and family remittances, Pedro Monreal points out that "…Even though Cuba may not be classified as a classical economy dependent on remittances, in recent years its dependency on remittances from abroad, particularly family remittances and donations, has become more apparent… Today emigration and family remittances play a leading economic and social role unprecedented in the nation's recent history and, in practice, remittances are working as a mechanism for international insertion…This phenomenon may indicate that today the exportation of workers is one of the areas with the most 'competitive advantages' for the country and in fact a significant section of the Cuban economy's 'modern' sector is outside its formal borders. One of the implications of this is that Cubans depend to a large extent on family remittances from abroad… The considerable increase in the flow of family remittances hints at the existence of a sort of 'one's own' modernizing effort in vast sectors of Cuban society".

Even though some attempts have been made to estimate it, the value of remittances has not been precisely determined and the estimation process continues to be enigmatic. Cuba's official balance of payments data reveal that in 1996 net foreign currency transferences -comprising mostly family remittances and donations- reached $743.7 million. Other Cuban estimates calculate the volume of remittances around 300 to 400 million dollars, while in 1996 ECLAC calculated them to be approximately $800 million. In his article, Monreal suggests a total of approximately $500 million.⁵

Remittances are, therefore, one of the most important sectors of Cuba's economy as far as its international insertion is concerned. In terms of gross foreign exchange revenues remittances are second only to tourism and sugar, but are first in terms of net foreign exchange revenues. In this economist's view the existence of a sizable foreign exchange internal trade around which a complex network of products and services has prospered, has spurred the reactivation of important economic activities -the so called border exports- and eased an international insertion of sorts, based mostly on remittances from abroad. This has made it possible to manage the economic adjustment process in a way more acceptable to society, avoiding the increase in unemployment that would derive from a direct insertion into the world market.

Nevertheless, the effects of remittances have also been felt in areas that are not compatible with the social justice policies that are being promoted. In fact, they have caused stratification among consumers, the fragmentation of markets and some manifestations of social inequality and exclusion, which have affected Cuban society's well-established value system.

Obviously, it is not an easy task to define the strategies and policies needed to better profit from remittances, especially since the U.S. is the main source of such remittances and as such could resort to manipulation by limiting such transfers under the argument that all "oxygen valves" to the Cuban political system must be closed, as if the embargo were not enough. Paradoxically, it appears that it is not.

From Cuba's point of view the problem is not the existence of remittances but rather how to incorporate them into the economy and society in an eventual future scenario of less conflicting relations with the U.S. The most important issue is not what happens in the short term but rather what would be the impact of a "transnational" family strategy. Meanwhile, at the micro level, families continue to adopt and implement their own "integration and cooperation models", regardless of their possible institutionalization.


Bibliography

Aja, A. "Aproximaciones al flujo migratorio externo de Cuba en la década de los 90s"; Anuario CEAP, Universidad de La Habana, 1996; "Cuban Emigration in the 1990s, Cuban Studies, Pittsburgh, No. 30, 1999.

Aja, A. " La emigración cubana entre dos siglos" Revista Temas. No. 26, July - September 2001. Havana, Cuba.

Centro de Estudios Demográficos, Universidad de La Habana. "La Población de Cuba"; 1974.

García, Q. R. and Montes N. "La migración internacional en el nuevo escenario. El dilema de las froteras". Centro de Estudios Demográficos, Universidad de la Habana (unpublished).

Hernández, C. R. "La Revolución Demográfica en Cuba". Editorial Ciencias Sociales, Havana; 1988.

Milán, G. "Estimados de cubanos residentes en el exterior", Anuario CEAP, Universidad de La Habana, 1995; "Los cubanos residentes en el exterior". Census by the Dirección de Atención a Cubanos Residentes en el Exterior (DACRE, of Cuba's MINREX); 1997.

Monreal, P.; "Migraciones y remesas familiares; Notas e hipótesis sobre el caso de Cuba". Centro de Investigaciones de la economía Internacional (CIEI), Universidad de La Habana; 2001 (in print).

¹ The Chinese "culies" arrived in Cuba under an eight years work contract with their 'owner'. Upon completion of that term, they were allowed to return to their country, if they could afford it. In fact, the voyage and work conditions were very similar to those experienced by the black slaves.

² An example of this is provided by the 1899 Census, which indicates that 8,000 Spanish people arrived from Jamaica in 1656, and other large groups from Florida, Louisiana and Santo Domingo (this included other nationalities, mostly French).

³ Population estimates calculated by the author based on growth rates between census periods (1861-1877), (1887-1899) and (1907-1919).

⁴ This law modifies the immigration status of all Cubans inspected and accepted by the US Immigration and Naturalization Services, to enable them to obtain residence status one year and one day after arriving in the U.S.

⁵ Monreal, P.: "Migraciones y remesas familiares. Notas e hipótesis sobre el caso Cuba". Centro de Investigaciones de la Economía Internacional (CIEI), Universidad de La Habana; 2001 (in print).

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